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Donald P . Morgan and Ian Toll
Charge-offs on credit card loans are rising sharply. While many analysts blame this trend on
an expanding supply of credit cards, a closer look reveals the importance of two demand 
factors—wealth and the share of the population at peak borrowing age—in explaining the
increase in bad debt.
Credit card charge-offs—the loans that banks write off
as uncollectible—are on the rise. Although this trend
has only recently made news, it has been under way for
more than a decade. From 1971 to 1983, commercial
banks charged off just 2.3 percent of their credit card
loans on average. Since 1983 the charge-off rate has
averaged 3.8 percent and is now approaching 5 percent.
This increase in charge-offs parallels the trend in the
household debt burden, which has climbed steeply
since the early 1980s. 
What is behind the rise in bad debt?  Most analysts
tend to blame lenders, arguing that banks are granting
credit cards to riskier borrowers without raising rates
to compensate. That supply-side focus is easy to under-
stand given the aggressive marketing of credit cards
in recent years, but it overlooks another possibility:
perhaps rising demand for credit is driving up debt burdens
and charge-offs.
This edition of Current Issues weighs both supply
and demand explanations for the rise in bad debt.
Beginning with the supply side, we ask whether contin-
ued growth in credit card balances—despite growing
risk—reflects a greater willingness on the part of credit
card lenders to gamble on risky borrowers. Although
several developments in the credit card industry have
the potential to expand the supply of credit card lend-
ing, we find no evidence that a supply shift has
occurred.  Interest rate spreads on credit cards have not
fallen since the early 1980s, nor have charge-offs on
credit cards risen faster than charge-offs on other con-
sumer loans. 
Our look at the demand side of the story is more
revealing. Our analysis shows that changes in two
important demand factors—wealth and the share of
heavy borrowers in the population—have influenced
the growth of debt burdens. Before 1983, these vari-
ables moved in offsetting directions, tending to stabi-
lize credit demand and the debt burden. Since 1983,
however, wealth and the share of heavy borrowers in
the population have increased together. Using regres-
sion analysis, we show that the combined force of these
two demand shifts does a good job of explaining the
rise in debt burdens and bad debt.
Charge-offs and the Household Debt Burden: 
Parallel Trends 
The rise in charge-offs closely mirrors the trend in the
overall household debt burden, defined as the ratio of
total debt to income (Chart 1).1 These parallel trends
are no mere coincidence; a mounting debt burden
causes higher charge-offs because heavily indebted
borrowers are more exposed to income shocks such as
layoffs, illness, and divorce. Credit card borrowers are
especially sensitive to such shocks because credit cards
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When income drops, the revolving feature of credit
card loans allows cardholders to slow the repayment of
their debt—or even run up their balances.2As their debt
accumulates, borrowers are then tempted to default on
their credit card debt because these loans are rarely
secured by collateral.
Despite this rising risk of charge-offs, credit card
balances have expanded dramatically—in real terms, by
11.5 percent per year between 1984 and 1996.3 Why are
analysts so quick to suggest that the rapid growth in
credit card debt reflects expanding supply? Several
developments in the credit card industry could lead one
to suspect a supply shift. As we explain below, the
potential for high profits, the securitization of credit
card loans, and the use of credit-scoring models to
assess the risk of borrowers could encourage lenders to
take on more risk.
Supply-Side Developments 
Profitability in the credit card industry has been two to
three times higher than in the overall banking system
since the early 1980s, when credit card rates were
deregulated.  Ausubel (1991) argues that profits in the
industry are higher than one would expect in a compet-
itive industry, even allowing for the higher charge-offs
and the other risks associated with credit card lending.
If he is correct, competition for those profits would
drive up charge-offs as new lenders who were willing to
gamble on riskier borrowers entered the market.4
A more recent development that could be expanding
credit card lending is securitization. Until the late
1980s, credit card lenders had to screen potential bor-
rowers, monitor the credit, and bear the risk. Today,
lenders can package the loans made to individual bor-
rowers into securities and sell them to investors.
Securitization allows the lenders to specialize in their
comparative advantage—screening and monitoring—
while shifting some of the risk to investors.5 Specializa-
tion, in turn, could lower the cost of producing credit
and thus increase the supply of lending. Securitization
might also expand the credit card lending of banks, in
particular, by reducing the amount of capital they
must hold to satisfy the requirements imposed by bank
regulators.6
The advent of credit-scoring models could also cause
a shift in the supply of credit cards. These models enable
lenders to use the credit histories of millions of borrow-
ers to predict the default risk of loan applicants. By
automating the credit-screening process, these comput-
erized models could increase the supply of credit card
loans by lowering the costs of producing credit. The
models may also allow more accurate screening, so
lenders can target narrower risk classes and price their
cards accordingly. This ability to slice and price the
market more precisely could expand credit card lending.
A Look at the Evidence
But have these factors created a supply shift? If so, we
would expect to see interest rates on credit card loans
falling relative to other interest rates. Yet credit card
spreads have actually trended upward over the past fif-
teen years (Chart 2). The spread shown in the chart is
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Chart 1
Credit Card Charge-offs and the Household Debt Burden
1971
Sources:  Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Reports of
Condition and Income; Ausubel (1995); Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts.




















Credit Card Rate and Spread
1982
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, G.19 Statistical 
Release “Terms of Credit at Commercial Banks and Finance Companies.”
Note:  The spread is the credit card rate less the one-year Treasury bill rate.









Several developments in the credit card industry
could lead one to suspect a supply shift.simply the difference between the credit card rate and
the one-year Treasury bill rate, which measures the cost
of funds to lenders. While the credit card rate has fallen
in recent years, the spread is a more relevant measure
because it reflects the compensation lenders require for
the risks they are taking.7Apart from cyclical variation,
the spread has clearly moved upward—from 6.1 per-
centage points in the second quarter of 1982 to 11 per-
centage points in the first quarter of 1996. This trend
parallels the climb in charge-offs shown in Chart 1,
indicating that banks have been raising the spread to
compensate for the rising risk of charge-offs.8
Another way to identify a supply shift in the credit
card market is to examine charge-offs on non-credit-
card consumer loans. If lenders have become more
willing to gamble on credit card loans than on other
consumer loans, credit card charge-offs should be ris-
ing at a faster rate. The charge-off rates on credit card
loans and on other consumer loans, primarily installment
loans, are shown in Chart 3. Contrary to the supply-side
story, charge-offs on other consumer loans have risen at
virtually the same rate as credit card charge-offs. 
Although developments in the credit card market
might lead one to suspect that a supply shift is causing
the rise in charge-offs, the evidence presented here con-
tradicts that story. Moreover, the uniform rise in all
consumer charge-offs steers us toward another explana-
tion: perhaps rising demand for credit is raising debt
burdens, making borrowers riskier, and forcing up
charge-offs across the board.
The Demand-Side Story
Our demand-side explanation draws on the two leading
theories of household borrowing—the permanent income
theory and the life-cycle theory. According to the perma-
nent income theory, spending and the demand for credit
will rise along with wealth. Suppose home values double.
To consume some of this new wealth without selling
their homes, homeowners can simply take out a loan. If
debt increases more than current income, households’
debt burden—the ratio of debt to income—rises.
The second theory relates the demand for credit to
borrowers’ age. According to this life-cycle theory,
people try to maintain a stable standard of living over
time, even though incomes tend to rise over a person’s
working life. To smooth consumption, younger individ-
uals borrow against future income and then work down
their debt as they grow older and their income rises. 
These two theories lead us to look for shifts in
wealth and demographics that could be driving up the
debt burden—and charge-offs. We measure wealth with
net worth per capita in 1983 dollars. Our age variable is
the percent of the population in the peak borrowing age
of twenty-five to fifty-four. We identified these as the
peak borrowing years on the basis of data from the
Federal Reserve Board’s periodic Survey of Consumer
Finances; the surveys for 1989 and 1992 reveal that the
debt burden is highest across those age groups (Canner,
Kennickell, and Luckett 1995). 
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Chart 3
Relative Charge-off Rates for Credit Card 
and Other Consumer Loans
1984
Source:  Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Reports of Condition
and Income.
Note:  Series are scaled by their first-quarter 1984 values.













Wealth and the Share of the U.S. Population Aged 
Twenty-Five to Fifty-Four
1956
Sources:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds 
Accounts; U.S. Bureau of the Census.
60 65 70 85 90 95





















The uniform rise in all consumer charge-offs
steers us toward another explanation: perhaps
rising demand for credit is raising debt burdens,
making borrowers riskier, and forcing up
charge-offs across the board.Although there have been several notable swings in
the net worth and age variables over the last forty years,
before 1983 the variables usually moved in opposite
directions (Chart 4). Between 1956 and 1972, the share
of the population at peak borrowing age was falling or
level while net worth was rising or stable. When net
worth began to fall in 1973, the share of heavy borrowers
had already begun to rise. According to the theory,
these counter movements should tend to offset the
effect on credit demand and debt burdens. In the early
1980s, however, net worth turned up, and both variables
have since risen together steadily. 
The combination of rising net worth and the increas-
ing share of heavy borrowers can account for the
mounting debt burden. Indeed, these two variables pre-
dict most of the variation in the debt burden over the
last forty years (Chart 5).9 The debt burden increased
only moderately between the late 1950s and the early
1980s, a period when the movements of the wealth and
age variables partially offset one another. Since the
early 1980s, the combined forces of rising net worth
and an increasing share of heavy borrowers have driven
up the household debt burden. 
The debt burden predicted by the wealth and age
variables can, in turn, explain the rise in charge-offs
(Chart 6).10 To demonstrate this relationship, we
regressed the charge-off rate on the level of the debt
burden we predicted using the wealth and age variables
(shown in Chart 5). We included the annual rate of job
growth in the regression to capture cyclical influences.
If a supply shift had occurred, the charge-off rate would
consistently exceed the rate we predicted using only the
demand-side and cyclical variables. Charge-offs were
somewhat higher than predicted in the early 1990s, but
that deviation likely reflects the added effect of the
recession in 1990-91. Since 1993, however, charge-offs
have actually been a bit lower than predicted. Overall,
the predicted rate tracks the actual rate very closely,
confirming the role of the demand-side factors in
explaining the increase in charge-offs.11
Conclusion 
Why are credit card charge-offs rising? Many analysts
blame lenders for supplying cards to riskier borrowers
without raising rates to compensate. Although we con-
sider developments that could expand credit card lend-
ing, we find no evidence that the rise in charge-offs
reflects a supply shift. Credit card spreads have risen
along with charge-offs over the past fifteen years, sug-
gesting that lenders are charging for the extra risk they
face. Moreover, charge-offs on other consumer loans
are rising just as fast as credit card charge-offs, sug-
gesting that some other force is driving up bad debt. 
Finding no evidence of a supply shift, we then con-
sider demand-side developments that many analysts
have overlooked. Two variables that drive household
borrowing, wealth and the share of heavy borrowers in
the population, moved in offsetting directions before
the early 1980s, keeping demand in check. Since
1983, however, these two variables have moved in one
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Chart 5
Actual and Predicted Debt Burden, 
Based on Wealth and Age
1956
Sources:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds
Accounts; U.S. Bureau of the Census; authors’ forecasts.











Actual and Predicted Credit Card Charge-offs,
Based on Predicted Debt Burden
1971
Sources:  Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Reports of
Condition and Income; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow
of Funds Accounts; authors’ forecasts.










The combination of rising net worth and the
increasing share of heavy borrowers can
account for the mounting debt burden.direction—up. This convergence has fueled the demand
for credit and has driven up debt burdens, making bor-
rowers riskier. As a result, bad debt is on the rise. 
Notes
1. The charge-off series in Chart 1 has two parts. The series since
1984 is from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council’s Reports of Condition and Income (commonly known as
Call Reports), which are filed each quarter by all U.S. banks. The
series before 1984 is from Lawrence Ausubel (1995), who derived it
from publications by Visa International. The two series had a corre-
lation of .97 in the period when they overlapped (1984-1991:2), so
we simply combined them to generate the series in Chart 1.
2. Borrowers are subject, of course, to a minimum payment and a
maximum credit limit. The revolving or open-ended feature distin-
guishes credit card lending from closed-end lending, such as install-
ment loans, which require fixed payments over a specified term and
do not allow additional borrowing.
3. The growth of credit card balances does not explain rising debt
burdens because credit card debt remains a small portion of total
household debt. 
4. Not all analysts accept Ausubel’s (1991) arguments; Ausubel
(1995) addresses his critics.
5. Although this shifting of risk would appear to tempt lenders to
offer cards to riskier borrowers, bankers report that the charge-off
rate on the loans they hold is about the same as that on securitized
loans (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1996). 
6. Banks are required to hold capital against their assets; securitiza-
tion reduces banks’assets and thus their required capital.
7. The credit card rate shown is the rate most commonly charged by
banks. Because banks now seem to offer a wider range of rates, we
were concerned that this mode rate might overstate the average rate
in recent years. To address this concern, we calculated the average
rate (interest income on credit card lending at all banks/credit card
balances at all banks) using data available since 1986 and found that
it tracked the mode rate very closely. Another consideration was
that banks might be lowering fees rather than spreads. Although
Ausubel (1991) notes that fees have declined steadily since the early
1980s, he also observes that lenders have raised late charges and
other “hidden” fees to compensate. 
8. We regressed the spread and the charge-off rate on a constant and
a trend term. The trend coefficients, .189 and .195, were both sig-
nificant (at 5 percent or lower) but did not differ significantly. By
comparing the spread with charge-offs, we accounted for the loss of
principal resulting from charge-offs but not the loss of interest. To
account for both, we used the risk-adjusted spread = rc – rt – p –
p (rc – rr), where rc denotes the credit card rate, rt the Treasury bill
rate, p the charge-off rate, and rr the recovery rate on charge-offs,
which is about 15 cents per dollar charged-off (according to the Call
Reports). Using that figure, we calculated the risk-adjusted spread
between 1982 and 1996 and found it was essentially trendless. This
result is not sensitive to the assumption of a constant recovery rate,
because the term prr is an order or two smaller than the other terms.
9. The ratio of debt to income was predicted using the following
regression equation, estimated with the forty-one annual observa-
tions between the first quarter of 1956 and the first quarter of 1996:
debt/income = -.064 + .007 (share aged 25 to 54) + .019 (real net
worth per capita). The coefficients were both significant at 5 per-
cent or lower. The adjusted R-squared is .91. If a trend is included,
the age variable is insignificant, but wealth is still highly signifi-
cant. We are inclined against including a trend, however, because
the life-cycle theory suggests that the demographic variable should
help explain the trend in the debt burden. 
10. The equation used to predict charge-offs, estimated using annual
observations between second-quarter 1971 and first-quarter 1996,
was as follows: charge-offs = -2.61 + 8.39 (predicted debt-to-
income ratio) – .193 (annual job growth). The predicted debt-to-
income ratio is plotted in Chart 5, and the equation used to predict
that ratio is described in note 9. All the coefficients are signifi-
cant at 5 percent or lower and the adjusted R-squared is .80.
Including lagged charge-offs eliminates the serial error in the
forecast and raises the adjusted R-squared to .94. 
11. If the demand for credit is increasing, wouldn’t the risk-adjusted
spread, described in note 8, be rising? Not necessarily, because the
demand factors we have identified—wealth and age—should
increase demand across the board, not just the demand for credit
card loans. Even if the relative demand for credit card loans were
increasing, the risk-adjusted spread would increase only if the sup-
ply of credit card loans were inelastic. If the supply is elastic,
lenders can accommodate the increased demand for loans without
raising the risk-adjusted spread. 
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